

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Final Report
"Whip Lash"

CCS 3510 (6 Feb 62) (S.2A)

JCS 1962 files

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- Jan 62

12 June 1962

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

HQ
SAC

(Downgraded at 3 pm instead)

Downgraded at 3 pm instead 3.6.5.2.2

12 June 1962

SUBJECT: Final Report, Exercise "Whip Lash" (U)

TO: See Distribution

PURPOSE

1. To exercise personnel in their emergency duties during limited/general war operations. (C)
2. To exercise the procedures of the Emergency Actions File (EAF). (S)
3. To exercise the Uniform System of Progressive Alert Procedures (DEFCONS). (S)
4. To exercise the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operational Reporting System (JOPREP). (S)
5. To exercise the control and execution of limited/general war plans including the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). (S)
6. To exercise reporting procedures for atomic operations (CAO SOP). (S)
7. To exercise and test communication procedures for atomic operations (CAO COI). (S)
8. To exercise the Nuclear Detonation and Radioactive Fallout Reporting System. (C)
9. To exercise continuity of operations procedures and Alternate Control Centers. (S)

TASKS

10. Strategic Air Command: (U)
 - a. Will exercise Contingency/General War Plans and reporting procedures. (S)
 - b. Will exercise alert procedures. (C)
 - c. Will exercise procedures of the Emergency Actions File. (S)
 - d. Will exercise the Nuclear Detonation and Radioactive Fallout Reporting Procedures. (C)
 - e. Is encouraged to conduct its own exercise in conjunction with

PARTICIPATING SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

11. Second Air Force

Eighth Air Force

Fifteenth Air Force (U)

PERIOD OF EXERCISE

12. Exercise Whip Lash was conducted from 0001Z, 8 May 1962 through 2117Z, 17 May 1962. (c)

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

13. Summary of Significant Events During Exercise Whip Lash:

May 11/2338Z - JCS directs all commands establish Double Take. SAC forces had previously been placed in an actual DEFCON 4, no simulation necessary. (S)

May 12/1630Z - CINCSAC placed tanker forces in support of CASF XRAY in a Fast Pace condition. Affected units began generation of required tankers. This action was taken as a result of previous actions which placed CINCSTRIKE CONUS forces supporting CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 in a ROUND HOUSE condition. (S)

May 15/1630Z - JCS directs all commands to assume ROUND HOUSE. SAC forces placed in ROUND HOUSE condition at 1630Z. Flying curtailed and units began generation of temporarily degraded alert sorties. All reflex deployments were terminated. (S)

May 16/1730Z - JCS directs SAC Strike Forces withdrawn from Moroccan bases due to abrogation of Moroccan base rights. Withdrawal completed at 1900Z. No degradation of 50 Order objectives resulted from this withdrawal as forces were positioned at Spanish bases in accordance with 16AF OPLAN 222-62. (S)

May 16/1946Z - JCS alerted SAC for possible implementation of 1/8

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 - a. Will exercise Contingency/General War Plans and reporting procedures. (S)
 - b. Will exercise alert procedures. (C)
 - c. Will exercise procedures of the Emergency Actions File. (S)
 - d. Will exercise the Nuclear Detonation and Radioactive Fallout Reporting Procedures. (C)
 - e. Is encouraged to conduct its own exercise in conjunction with Exercise "Whip Lash", as deemed advisable, paying particular attention to insure that association with the world-wide exercise is not revealed. (C)
 - f. Will operate the Joint Coordination Centers (Europe and Far East) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (S)

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downgraded AT 3 Year intervals
S. Date 8 Dec 2001 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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May 16/1946Z - JCS alerted SAC for possible implementation of 1/8 Airborne Alert Posture. (S)

May 17/0038Z - JCS authorized SAC to assume 1/8 level Airborne Alert. Airborne Alert Posture implemented and phase out of Indoctrination Level and Phase in of Increased Airborne Alert posture was commenced. (S)

May 17/1400Z - CINCEUR declared COCKED PISTOL. SAC established FAST PACE condition. SAC "A" Hour established at 17/1400Z and units began generation of follow-on forces. (S)

May 17/1505Z - CINCSAC declared COCKED PISTOL at 1505Z. (S)

May 17/1525Z - JCS established "A" hour of 1525Z. Directed all commands to assume COCKED PISTOL at 17/1525Z. No SAC action required as SAC had previously established directed conditions. (S)

May 17/1615Z - BMEWS Alarm Level 1 received and displayed on the SAC Situation Display. (S)

May 17/1615Z - SAC Ground Alert Force placed in Minimum Reaction Posture. (S)

May 17/1617Z - CINCNORAD established "BIG NOISE." (S)

May 17/1620Z - SAC aircraft ground alert force launched positive control, Option 1, no withhold, L-Hour 17/1620Z. (S)

May 17/1620Z - Missile force directed to assume COCKED PISTOL MIKE. Missiles initiated countdown to Minimum Hold Configuration at 17/1620Z. (S)

May 17/1630Z - JCS declares E-Hour in HARD ROCK 1A message. (S)

May 17/1650Z - Confirming EMATS message received by SAC at 1650Z. (S)

May 17/1650Z - CINCSAC executes Airborne and Follow On aircraft and Missiles. Option 1, no withhold, E-Hour at 17/1630Z. (S)

May 17/2117Z - JCS terminated Exercise Whip Lash at 17/2117Z. (S)

DISCUSSION

14. GENERAL:

a. We believe exercise Whip Lash was highly successful in that it provided a realistic test of staff problem solving of situations leading to general war. The exercise was a continuation of efforts to inject realism into JCS global tests and provided the opportunity for refinement of current emergency procedures. (S)

b. The gradual intelligence build

c. Six time-over-target conflicts were identified during the course of the five hour exercise. Of the six, three involved CINCSAC with CINCPAC, two between CINCSAC and CINCEUR and one between CINCSAC and CINCLANT. CINCSAC was asked to delay on one of the conflicts with CINCPAC, but this was impossible because the CINCSAC sortie was in excess of four hours enroute to the target. The identification of six conflicts, five of which were timely enough to permit resolution, is testimony to the necessity for continuation of the Joint Coordination function. (S)

d. Due to the length of the exercise no requests for support (ATREQ) were received from the other commands. However, three resumes of post-strike results (ATRES) were received from the Joint Coordination Center-Europe. (S)

e. Specific recommendations concerning refinements to the Joint Operational Reporting System (JCS Pub 6) are contained in Annexes hereto. (C)

f. Exercise Whip Lash was a beneficial Battle Staff exercise. The exercise enabled the SAC Battle Staff to exercise various contingency plans not previously exercised during a JCS directed CPX. These contingency plans were those implemented as a result of the abrogation of SAC base rights at Lajes and Moroccan Bases. (S)

g. Authorization of increased SAC airborne alert posture additionally contributed to the overall effectiveness of the exercise. Important lessons were learned as a result of this action. (S)

h. Probability of SAC being required to provide refueling support to CINCSSTRIKE forces generated considerable Battle Staff planning activity. An important lesson learned was the advisability of utilizing aircraft possessed by units not having a SIOP commitment (non-ready units), to serve as replacement aircraft for those units involved in a SAC/STRIKE deployment. Utilizing this procedure would permit SAC to support CASF commitments without degrading 50 EWO commitments. (S)

i. A total of 32 NUDETS affected the play of the exercise for this command.

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a. We believe exercise Whip Lash was highly successful in that it provided a realistic test of staff problem solving of situations leading to general war. The exercise was a continuation of efforts to inject realism into JCS global tests and provided the opportunity for refinement of current emergency procedures. (S)

b. The gradual intelligence build up permitted maximum participation in the CPX, although we believe it extremely doubtful that an enemy would provide his adversary with a lengthy period of counter-preparation when it would be to his advantage to use the element of surprise for initiation of hostile action. (S)

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d. Due to the length of the exercise no requests for support (ATREQ) were received from the other commands. However, three resumes of post-strike results (ATRES) were received from the Joint Coordination Center-Europe. (S)

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i. A total of 32 NUDETS affected the play of the exercise for this command. These were well developed, and provided the SAC Damage Evaluation Teams energetic and realistic experience. In addition to assessing simulated damage to installations affected, SAC teams processed all NUDETS for the effects of fallout. (S)

~~SECRET~~
j. Situations injected into the exercise attained new heights in realism in that NUDETS affected all commands equally, and communications casualties were not restricted to one command at the exclusion of the others.

(S)

k. SAC Communications support to exercise Whip Lash is described in Annex I. (U)

CONCLUSIONS

15. Whip Lash provided a fine vehicle for testing emergency procedures, exercising reporting systems and training battle staff members. We believe continuing exercises of this nature will be beneficial as long as a clear distinction between CPX "realism" and war gaming "realism" is preserved. (S)

16. Factors injected to test problem solving capabilities should continue to be as realistic as possible, as long as objectives are not compromised by war gaming conclusions derived therefrom. Realism can best be accomplished if all commands continue to operate under a common set of ground rules with no exclusions. A single set of situations incumbent upon all commands will provide a basis for intelligent monitoring of an exercise, as well as providing a more realistic basis for the decisions necessary as a result of the situations.

(S)

17. Simulated force operation utilizing SIOP-62 again demonstrated that effective planning keeps target conflicts to a minimum. However, conflicts did occur and will continue to do so with SIOP, under post-SIOP operations or execution of other command plans. In addition, the requirement for keeping the JCS and Unified/Specified commands informed assumes even greater significance with the current integrated planning efforts. Whip Lash re-emphasized a continuing requirement for the Joint Coordination Centers and their mission. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Recommendations concerning those specific minor problem areas are contained in individual Annexes to this report as required by Annex F to JCS OPLAN 1-62. (U)

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COMMUNICATIONS

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for *Errett A. McDonald*
CHARLES M. EISENHART
Major General, USAF
Directorate of Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

JCS - 60 cys
USAF - 20 cys (AFOOP)
SAC - 15 cys

COMMUNICATIONS

ANNEX I

COMMUNICATIONS

1. The communications activity supporting this exercise was not significant from the standpoint of volume. The major activity associated with this exercise was the interplay of the communications casualties. Supporting this interplay was the activity by the AT&T teams. For the first time in any CPX, AT&T played an active role in a situation exercise which very closely resembled one which we could expect under emergency conditions. It is considered significant to mention that at no time did this command lose complete contact with a SAC location or location of interest to SAC. This we attribute to the dual route concept of this command as well as a highly effective emergency radio net. Here at the Headquarters SAC Command Post, an AT&T "Trusted Agent" was available from the beginning through the end to act as Liaison and obtain rapid answers from the various locations in the Zone of the Interior where AT&T was affected. SAC was especially interested in communications situations numbers 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34 and 36. Situations 30 and 36 were of especial importance to SAC as these were SAC bases and, in one instance, (No. 36) a major subordinate headquarters and communications relay station. We were most interested in the solution to these problems at local base level. In both instances, we requested USAF people "on the scene" to evaluate the "paper" solution to the problem. We were impressed with the manner in which the "Trusted Agent" here at SAC was able to obtain rapid concise answers from "on the scene" AT&T personnel. This activity was healthy for both AT&T and the military and is recommended as a permanent feature of any future exercise. (U)

higher precedence. In computing the time factor associated with this traffic, it was noted that misleading traffic delays could be portrayed if pure "file time to TOR" was used. This was due to the fact that at least one third of the traffic received bore a readdressed pilot. Obviously the communications delay inserted by this procedure should not be charged against communications handling. An analysis of the handling time of operational immediate messages which were not readdressed reflected an average handling time of 57.2 minutes. This is considered excessive for an exercise of this nature. Future JCS exercises should have a maximum handling time goal of 30 minutes "writer to reader" on all OP traffic. (U)

3. Two major difficulties were encountered at a most critical time in this exercise. The first difficulty was the very poor quality on the JCSAN conference call which was in progress immediately prior to "E" hour. This conference was subjected to radio interference from the Caribbean as well as "operator break in" by the MacDill AFB operator. It is understood that action has been taken to preclude future recurrences of this nature. Secondly, the very critical EMATS message announcing "E" hour and the option was delayed. The conference (voice) announcement of E hour was received (very poor quality) at 171630Z. An overlined copy of the EMATS message was received at 171644Z and a legible copy was finally received at 171650Z. This highly unsatisfactory performance was attributed to personnel error at AJCC. It is urged that practice sessions be set up to insure a more rapid transmission of this most vital message. (C)

4. In regard to the MINIMIZE implication of the exercise, it

significant from the standpoint of volume. The major activity associated with this exercise was the interplay of the communications casualties. Supporting this interplay was the activity by the AT&T teams. For the first time in any CPX, AT&T played an active role in a situation exercise which very closely resembled one which we could expect under emergency conditions. It is considered significant to mention that at no time did this command lose complete contact with a SAC location or location of interest to SAC. This we attribute to the dual route concept of this command as well as a highly effective emergency radio net. Here at the Headquarters SAC Command Post, an AT&T "Trusted Agent" was available from the beginning through the end to act as Liaison and obtain rapid answers from the various locations in the Zone of the Interior where AT&T was affected. SAC was especially interested in communications situations numbers 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34 and 36. Situations 30 and 36 were of especial importance to SAC as these were SAC bases and, in one instance, (No. 36) a major subordinate headquarters and communications relay station. We were most interested in the solution to these problems at local base level. In both instances, we requested USAF people "on the scene" to evaluate the "paper" solution to the problem. We were impressed with the manner in which the "Trusted Agent" here at SAC was able to obtain rapid concise answers from "on the scene" AT&T personnel. This activity was healthy for both AT&T and the military and is recommended as a permanent feature of any future exercise. (U)

2. As mentioned previously, the traffic volume was low (total rec'd 534). Of this volume, 405 were operational immediate or

be portrayed if pure "file time to TOR" was used. This was due to the fact that at least one third of the traffic received bore a readdressed pilot. Obviously the communications delay inserted by this procedure should not be charged against communications handling. An analysis of the handling time of operational immediate messages which were not readdressed reflected an average handling time of 57.2 minutes. This is considered excessive for an exercise of this nature. Future JCS exercises should have a maximum handling time goal of 30 minutes "writer to reader" on all OP traffic. (U)

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4. In regard to the MINIMIZE implication of the exercise, it is considered significant to mention the procedure which would normally be used within this command even though this feature



[REDACTED]

of the exercise was canceled. This command automatically implements MINIMIZE upon declaration of a DEFCON 2 in accordance with instructions contained in the JCS Emergency Actions File. This notification is given to all SAC units by voice on the SAC Primary Alerting System and followed up by a confirming teletype. It is estimated that the voice message would be to all SAC units within less than 15 seconds and would require approximately 15 additional minutes to implement locally at each base. (S)

5. A negative report is submitted on the communication security monitor report. The special teletype handling report as required by paragraph 4,b (1), Annex F, JCS Operations Plan 1-62 is set forth in Atch 1. (U)

Part I: Terminated AM and EM Messages from JCS.

Message identification

<u>DTG</u>	<u>F/T</u>	<u>CITE NBR</u>	<u>TIME OF RECEIPT</u>	<u>TIME OF DELIVERY</u>	<u>ELAPSED TIME</u>
171400Z	17/1403Z	JCS 0564	171412Z	171415Z	15
171630Z	17/1648Z	JCS 0568	171705Z	171709Z	39
171655Z	17/1659Z	JCS 0569	171710Z	171715Z	20
171525Z	17/1525Z	JCS 0573	171532Z	171538Z	13

The above messages, JCS 0568 and JCS 0569 were not traced as excessive delayed messages due to the fact they were previously received via EMATS with-in the prescribed time limit (15 minutes). (U)

Atch 1

Part II. Originated Operational Immediate and Higher to JCS.

<u>DTG</u>	<u>F/T</u>	<u>CITE NBR</u>	<u>TIME OF START OF XMISSION</u>	<u>TIME OF COMPLETED XMISSION</u>	<u>ELAPSED TIME</u>
151631Z	15/1635Z	ZIPPO 05-518	HQ 151701Z YCR 151701Z	151703Z 151703Z	32 32
160430Z	16/0440Z	JOPREP 05-536	HQ 160455Z YCR 160455Z	160456Z 160456Z	26 26
171420Z	17/1423Z	ZIPPO 05-057	HQ 171444Z YCR 161449Z	171446Z 171451Z	26 31
171516Z	17/1518Z	ZIPPO 05-060	HQ 171533Z YCR 171536Z	171535Z 171538Z	19 22
171639Z	17/1641Z	ZIPPO 05-065	HQ 171703Z YCR 171709Z	171705Z 171711Z	26 32
172240Z	17/2310Z	ZIPPO 05-076	HQ 172315Z YCR 172317Z	172317Z 172319Z	37 39

1. Message cite # ZIPPO 05-518 (Emergency) required 32 minutes from DTG to time of completed transmission to RJEZHQ and RJEYCR due to the following reasons. (U)

a. The message was filed in the communications center at 151631Z, 4 minutes elapsed. (U)

b. The remaining 28 minutes were consumed within the ZIPPO message center for routing, tape cutting, tape multiplication and final transmission to the distant end. (U)

c. This message contained 29 action addressees and was filed simultaneously with another Emergency precedence message. (U)

2. Message cite # JOPREP 05-536 (Operational Immediate) required a twenty six minutes from date time group to time of transmission to RJEZHQ and RJEYCR. (U)

a. This message carried a date time group of 160430Z and a file time in the Zippo Message Center of 16/0440Z which is an elapsed time of 10 minutes. (U)

b. An additional five minutes were required for routing, tape

c. This message was then transmitted over the Zippo remote reperforator multiplication channel for the purpose of manufacturing additional tapes for transmission to the distant stations. As it was necessary to reproduce seven tapes, this action required an additional 7 minutes. Still another 3 minutes was then required by the Relay in order to send and complete transmission to RJEZHQ and RJEYCR. (U)

3. Message cite # ZIPPO 05-057 (Emergency) required 26 minutes to RJEZHQ and 31 minutes to RJEYCR due to the following reasons: (U)

a. The message was filed at 17/1423Z with a DTG of 171420Z. 3 minutes elapsed. (U)

b. The remaining 23 minutes to RJEZHQ and 28 minutes to RJEYCR are attributed to routing (10 minutes approximate), tape cutting (5 minutes), routing line segregation and transmission to the relay for on-ward relay. As this message contained 26 action addressees, it was necessary to segregate the addresses into three separate transmission to the relay. RJEYCR was called in the second transmission thus explaining the additional time over that of the RJEZHQ transmission (5 minutes earlier). (U)

4. Message cite # ZIPPO 05-060 (Emergency) required 19 minutes from DTG to time of completed transmission to RJEZHQ and 22 minutes to RJEYCR. (U)

a. This message carried a DTG of 171516Z and a time of file in the Zippo message center of 17/1518Z, an elapsed time of 2 minutes. (U)

b. An additional 10 minutes were required to correctly route and cut this message. (U)

c. The first transmission which included RJEZHQ took approximately 5 minutes to segregate and transmit to Relay and another 2 minutes to receive in Relay and completely transmit to RJEZHQ. (U)

<u>DTG</u>	<u>F/T</u>	<u>CITE NBR</u>	<u>DATE OF XMISSION</u>	<u>COMPLETED XMISSION</u>	<u>ELAPSED TIME</u>
151631Z	15/1635Z	ZIPPO 05-518	HQ 151701Z YCR 151701Z	151703Z 151703Z	32 32
160430Z	16/0440Z	JOPREP 05-536	HQ 160455Z YCR 160455Z	160456Z 160456Z	26 26
171420Z	17/1423Z	ZIPPO 05-057	HQ 171444Z YCR 161444Z	171446Z 171451Z	26 31
171516Z	17/1518Z	ZIPPO 05-060	HQ 171533Z YCR 171536Z	171535Z 171538Z	19 22
171639Z	17/1641Z	ZIPPO 05-065	HQ 171703Z YCR 171709Z	171705Z 171711Z	26 32
172240Z	17/2310Z	ZIPPO 05-076	HQ 172315Z YCR 172317Z	172317Z 172319Z	37 39

(u)

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a. The message was filed in the communications center at 151631Z, 4 minutes elapsed. (u)

b. The remaining 28 minutes were consumed within the ZIPPO message center for routing, tape cutting, tape multiplication and final transmission to the distant end. (u)

c. This message contained 29 action addressees and was filed simultaneously with another Emergency precedence message. (u)

2. Message cite # JOPREP 05-536 (Operational Immediate) required a twenty six minutes from date time group to time of transmission to RJEZHQ and RJEYCR. (u)

a. This message carried a date time group of 160430Z and a file time in the Zippo Message Center of 16/0440Z which is an elapsed time of 10 minutes. (u)

b. An additional five minutes were required for routing, tape multiplication, and tape preparation in the Zippo message center. (u)

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a. The message was filed at 17/1423Z with a DTG of 171420Z. 3 minutes elapsed. (U)

b. The remaining 23 minutes to RJEZHQ and 28 minutes to RJEYCR are attributed to routing (10 minutes approximate), tape cutting (5 minutes), routing line segregation and transmission to the relay for on-ward relay. As this message contained 26 action addressees, it was necessary to segregate the addresses into three separate transmission to the relay. RJEYCR was called in the second transmission thus explaining the additional time over that of the RJEZHQ transmission (5 minutes earlier). (U)

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a. This message carried a DTG of 171516Z and a time of file in the Zippo message center of 17/1518Z, an elapsed time of 2 minutes. (U)

b. An additional 10 minutes were required to correctly route and cut this message. (U)

c. The first transmission which included RJEZHQ took approximately 5 minutes to segregate and transmit to Relay and another 2 minutes to receive in Relay and completely transmit to RJEZHQ. (U)

d. Due to the number of addressees, this message had to be divided into three separate transmissions. RJEYCR was included in the second transmission and required 7 minutes to segregate and transmit to relay and another 3 minutes to receive in relay and completely transmit to RJEYCR. (U)

5. Message cite # ZIPPO 05-065 (Emergency) 26 minutes to RJEZHQ and 32 minutes to RJEYCR due reasons as follows:(U)

a. The message DTG was 171639Z and filed in the Zippo message center 2 minutes later. (U)

b. This message contained 26 action addressees which required approximately 10 minutes for routing, 5 minutes for tape cutting and 6 minutes for routing segregation and transmission to the RJEZHQ transmit position. To this point 23 minutes elapsed from the DTG. The remaining 3 minutes was utilized for final transmission to RJEZHQ. (U)

c. As this message contained 26 addressees it was necessary to make three separate transmission from the Zippo center. The RJEYCR transmission was the second transmission thus requiring an additional six minutes to reach the RJEYCR position and complete on-ward transmission. (U)

6. Message cite # ZIPPO 05-076 (Emergency) required 37 minutes from DTG to time of completed transmission to RJEZHQ and 39 minutes from DTG to time of completed transmission to RJEYCR. (U)

a. This message carried a DTG of 172240Z and a file time in the Zippo message center of 17/2310Z which was an elapsed time of 30 minutes. (U)

b. This message contained 26 action addressees which were exactly repetitious of previously received messages therefore requiring only three minutes to route. (U)

transmission to the Relay and two more minutes to complete transmission to RJEZHQ. (U)

d. Due to the amount of addressees (26) this message had to be transmitted from the Zippo center three times. RJEYCR was called in the second transmission thus requiring an additional two minutes over that transmission to RJEZHQ. (U)

7. These messages run on the average of 210 groups each and were routed to approximately 26 addressees which required an average routing time of 10 minutes per message. (U)

It takes an operator an average of 5 minutes, cutting at the rate of 40 words per minute, to complete one message. (U)

Each message required three transmissions to the Relay due to the number of addressees (6 minutes per transmission). Each of these transmissions are manually segregated and approximately 6 tapes are reproduced for relay protection. (U)

The initial transmissions would have been received in the Relay in an average time of 21 minutes after time of file in the Zippo center. Each additional transmission from Zippo center required 5 to 6 minutes more than the first transmission. (U)

The Relay would then require 2 to 3 more minutes to complete transmission to all addressees. (U)

The overall average time for a station (RJEZHQ) called in the first transmission is 23 minutes. The average time for a station called in the second transmission (RJEYCR) is approximately 28 minutes. (U)

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Atch 2

INTELLIGENCE

PROBLEM:

One serious problem disclosed during the play of the exercise - assuming actual reporting procedures were utilized - insofar as SAC intelligence was concerned was related to the developing Soviet submarine threat in coastal waters of CONUS. (C)

DISCUSSION:

Current estimates indicate a definitely increasing Soviet subforce both in terms of numbers and capability. With the advent of more sophisticated submarines into the Soviet naval inventory, both nuclear powered and missile-equipped, the threat to SAC forces increases commensurately. At present, there are 37 SAC bases within 300 miles of the coastal limits of the U.S. and of the overseas bases all are within this distance of the shores. Such a threat to SAC's strike capability is intolerable in itself, but to have this threat operating in waters adjacent to U.S. coastal territory without a virtual ironclad defensive capability is suicidal to national survival. (S)

CONCLUSION:

During the course of this latest exercise some seven or eight sightings were reported and one was kept under constant surveillance. Two sightings were presumed to be missile equipped and one of these was dropped from reporting after the initial report. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

In the interests of keeping the CINCSAC completely and accurately posted on the details of this threat to his force prior to launch, it seems that a better format of reporting both in terms of individual sightings and their status, type, etc., but also a cumulative totaling of the sightings and assessment of the developments of this threat picture should be disseminated by commands directly responsible for this problem of defense. Dissemination should be periodic, narrative, and direct to CINCSAC so that he is constantly aware of the status of the threat and can take the necessary steps to preserve his forces intact prior to an enemy thrust.

INTELLIGENCE

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PROBLEMS

PROBLEM:

Exercise ground rules restricted CINC's from declaring an "A" Hour in advance of JCS "A" Hour. (S)

DISCUSSION:

Progression to the higher conditions of readiness was not accomplished on a realistic basis. Considering exercise intelligence inputs SAC would have declared a DEFCON 2 (SAC "A" Hour) in advance of the JCS declaration of an "A" Hour. However, exercise ground rules prevented SAC from establishing a SAC "A" Hour in advance of a JCS "A" Hour. As a result of this exercise restriction, SAC was not permitted to simulate dispersal of forces and ground losses incurred by Nudets were higher than what normally would have been experienced. SAC must generate forces prior to dispersal of forces and for this reason the restriction on the establishment of a SAC "A" hour prevented the exercise of dispersal actions. (S)

CONCLUSIONS:

Restrictive measures that are not normally imposed on CINC's for actual purposes should not be imposed during exercises. Imposition of restrictive measures results in an inability to exercise various force posture and force movement plans established by the various CINC's. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That CINC's be authorized to make individual decisions with reference to the establishment of an A hour for their forces during future JCS directed exercises. (S)

PROBLEM:

Excessive delay encountered at JWR & JWRA when submitting SIOP/FORGEN and SIOP/LAUNCH VOICE REPORTS. (S)

DISCUSSION:

Pre-exercise instructions received via telephone, directed submission of the SIOP/LAUNCH and SIOP/FORGEN reports to JACE Drop 96. SAC was unable to locate an interested agency at this drop so JOPREP voice reports were made IAW JCS Pub 6, para 20106b. (S)

On the initial SIOP/FORGEN report, SAC tried unsuccessfully for 20 minutes to contact the JWR Battle Staff representative. The call was then transferred to JWRA who advised SAC that JWR (Battle Staff Representative) should receive the SIOP/FORGEN report but reluctantly agreed to accept it themselves. All persons initially contacted regarding this report has no apparent knowledge of the report requirement or format. (S)

CONCLUSION:

Procedures should be established to insure expeditious reception of JCS incoming voice traffic. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Amend JCS Pub 6 to indicate an OPI for voice reporting. (S)

Insure that the OPI representative has necessary pre-positioned formats to facilitate copying of incoming voice traffic. (S)

PROBLEM:

Exercise code words were not established for exercise Whip Lash SIOP/
LAUNCH reporting. (S)

DISCUSSION:

JCS Pub 6, para 30118 item 7c note 2, states "Separate code words will be developed for exercise purposes." This note is in contradiction to the last sentence in item 7c. (S)

CONCLUSION:

JCS Pub 6 is ambiguous in this area. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

Para 30118, delete either last sentence of item 7c or note 2. (S)

Atch 3

PROBLEM:

SAC received several exercise Whip Lash messages which could not be identified. (S)

DISCUSSION:

SISUM, SIRSUM, and SITSUM are not JCS Pub 6 acronyms. (S)

CONCLUSION:

Format messages which are not identifiable in manuals and regulations possessed by this headquarters should not be addressed to SAC. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

Notify all commands to report IAW JCS Pub 6, to include use of JOPREP acronym and narrative when JCS Pub 6 format type messages are not compatible with information to be reported. (S)

Atch 4

PROBLEM:

JOPREP reports received which were not IAW JCS Pub 6 para 30102 (i.e., did not fit into a specific message category) were difficult to identify and catalogue. (S)

DISCUSSION:

The JCS reporting manual cannot provide a specific report for every situation and should not be required to provide reports vehicles in anticipation or accommodation of situations not considered essential. (S)

CONCLUSION:

Narrative reports not specifically provided for in JCS Pub 6 should be limited to essential information and should contain a subject identifier item. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

Amend JCS Pub 6 para 20108 b(1)(a) to require a subject identifier when a short title (30103 to 30124) is not utilized. (S)

Atch 5

PROBLEM:

JCS teletype message 0568 (confirming EMATS 0568) was not received in SAC Combat Reports Section until 40 minutes after "E" Hour was established. (S)

DISCUSSION:

Originator's date/time group was: 17/1630Z. (S)

Filing time was: 17/1648Z. (S)

Received in SAC at: 17/1710Z. (S)

Message carried a FLASH precedence. (S)

CONCLUSION:

"FLASH" precedence dictates processing with utmost dispatch. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Review procedures as necessary. (U)

Re-emphasize significance of "FLASH" precedence to communications personnel at all echelons. (U)

Atch 6